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Avian influenza is an endemic disease in Indonesia and outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza resulted in high mortality rates in poultry flocks and economic losses.
Due to the outbreaks in 2005 a partnership program was established between the Ministry of Agriculture in Indonesia and the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality (LNV) to assist the Indonesian government in the control of HPAI in Indonesia. The aim is to assist local veterinarians and farmers to improve control measures and to get insight in the epidemiological characteristics of the HPAI infection which might also contribute to improving existing control strategies. The greatest threat in spreading the disease is mechanical transmission, especially due to human involvement by transferring infective organic material from infected to susceptible birds by  movement of personnel, equipment and vehicles between farms.
The aim of this multi-intervention project was to investigate the incidence of HPAI and to examine the most important causes of morbidity and mortality among poultry flocks located in this district. In addition, risk factors which may contribute to the occurrence of disease were identified.







Outbreaks of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) H5N1 virus among poultry flocks have been reported since 1997. Since then the infection has spread to many countries in the world. HPAI outbreaks are usually successfully controlled by stamping out infected flocks and several other measures like a standstill and hygienic measures. However in some countries in Asia and Africa the disease has become endemic (OIE, 2010). The disease can be devastating for the poultry industry and public health officers also fear the disease for the pandemic threat of disease in  humans.
One of the countries where AI is endemic is Indonesia. Since the first outbreak was detected in August 2003 the virus has spread rapidly across the country so fast that at present 31 out of 33 provinces are considered to be endemically infected. Outbreaks resulted in high mortality rates in poultry flocks, and economic losses. The disease is now controlled by large scale vaccination programs implemented for commercial poultry flocks. Small scale chicken holders however, do not apply control measures. Despite control  measures outbreaks are still reported, although the number is limited and are only reported to occur in backyard flocks. In addition to the infection in  poultry, several humans became infected, of which more than 100 died from the infection (WHO, 2010).
In 2005, a partnership program was established between the Ministry of Agriculture in Indonesia and the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality (LNV) to assist the Indonesian government in the control of HPAI in Indonesia. As part of the activities of this Indonesian-Dutch partnership, a multi-intervention pilot project is to be conducted. This pilot project aims to control HPAI outbreaks in one defined area and in all sectors of poultry production such as commercial breeding farms, commercial broiler farms, slaughter and poultry collecting facilities, nomadic duck flocks, and village backyard poultry flocks, using a variety of control measures. The aim is to assist local veterinarians and farmers to improve control measures and to get insight in the epidemiological characteristics of the HPAI infection which might also contribute to improving existing control strategies.





Avian influenza are placed in the family of Orthomyxoviridae which have segmented, negative-sense, single-stranded RNA genomes.1,2 The Orthomyxoviridae family consists of five genera: Influenzavirus A, Influenzavirus B, Influenzavirus C, Thogotovirus and Isavirus.1
Only viruses of the Influenzavirus A genus are known to infect birds.1,2 Type A influenza viruses are further divided into subtypes based on the antigenic relationships of the surface glycoproteins, haemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA). Sixteen HA subtypes (H1–H16) and nine NA subtypes (N1–N9) have been identified. Most strains are of low pathogenicity and produce either subclinical infections or respiratory and/or reproductive diseases in a variety of domestic and wild bird species.2 Viruses of the H5 and H7 subtypes have been shown to cause HPAI which results in high morbidity and mortality.1 It appears that most of these HPAI viruses originated through mutation of the haemagglutinin surface protein from LPAI H5 and H7 viruses after they were introduced into poultry from the wild bird reservoir.1,2 The factors that bring about mutation from LPAI to HPAI are not known.1 It is impossible to predict if and when this mutation will occur because in some instances, mutation seems to have taken place rapidly after introduction from wild birds where in other occasions the LPAI virus progenitor circulated in poultry for months before mutating. However, it can be reasonably assumed that the wider the circulation of LPAI in poultry, the higher the chance that there will be a mutation to HPAI.1,3,4,5,6,7

Transmission
It seems that transmission from bird to bird occurs as a result of close proximity between infected and naïve hosts. Direct contact with infected birds or with contaminated exudates or droppings are necessary for infection to be transmitted from one bird to another. This also indicates that airborne spread over large distances is an unlikely event.1 There is some evidence that airborne spread during  an outbreak in Pennsylvania 1983-1984 played a role amongst very closely situated farms and that flying insects could become contaminated with infected feces and thus spreading the AI virus mechanically.8,9,10,11,12,13
It is known that the probability of incursion of virus into a population depends on the frequency of contact between birds. After introduction, secondary spread of the virus within the area is usually associated with human involvement, probably by transferring infective organic material from infected to susceptible birds by movement of personnel, equipment and vehicles between farms.1,5,6,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16 

Clinical signs in poultry
Influenza infections in poultry can be asymptomatic, but it often causes production losses and a range of clinical disease from mild to severe in affected flocks.
LPAI does not cause high mortality (2-3%) in affected flocks and can easily be confused with other conditions. LPAI infections can go unnoticed but typically it causes mucosal infection in the respiratory and/or enteric tract.1,5 Among the clinical signs rales, snicking and light coughing may be observed.1 Sexually mature broiler breeders may have a fevered condition accompanied by depression, somnolence and loss of appetite. This can be followed by a drop in egg production. Cyanosis of the combs and wattles may be seen in a few birds in this stage. In an acute stage of illness misshapen eggs and/or discoloring may be seen.


HPAI on the other hand causes severe systemic infections which result in high mortality in affected flocks.5 Flock mortality may be as high as 100% within three to four days from the onset of the first clinical signs. Symptoms start with anorexia, depression and a major drop in egg production. These symptoms are followed by nervous signs, prostration, reluctance to move, tremors of the head, paralysis of the wings and incoordination of leg movement. Typical lesions include cyanosis of the comb and wattles and petechial haemorrhages on the hock. Also sudden death occurs in a recumbent position and is preceded by pedaling movements and gasping. Some birds show severe congestion of the comb, conjunctivitis and periorbital edema. Recovery is a rare event.1

Aim of this project

Environmental factors may play a major role in both the primary as the secondary spread of HPAI, especially in poultry slaughter- or collector houses (PCF) who receive poultry from different origins and who are also distributing poultry on their turn. Therefore, the importance of knowing the influence of environmental or other risk factors is that strategies can be designed to improve the health of this poultry in order to decrease this potential transmission of pathogens to commercial farms as well as to other poultry flocks.
The aim of this multi-intervention project was to investigate the incidence of HPAI and to examine the most important causes of morbidity and mortality among poultry flocks located in this district. In addition, risk factors which may contribute to the occurrence of disease were identified.












The same surveillance had also been conducted in January 2010, so general information concerning the slaughterhouses had already been gathered during that period. Because of that a brief questionnaire was used this time (appendix). The questions in this new questionnaire concerned the status of the environment (cleaning and disinfection per consignment), the origin of the poultry and the destination if this poultry would be sold alive. The purpose was to find out if environmental factors contribute in the spread of avian influenza.





The first stage of sample taking was to inform the six slaughterhouses in the area. So during the first days the owners were visited to explain the purpose of the research project and they were allowed to ask questions so that everything would be clear to them. The idea was that they called the research team if a consignment was coming.
Because of the budget it was only possible to take samples from one consignment per slaughterhouse per day.

The sample taking and data gathering
When an owner of a slaughterhouse expected a consignment that day, he would call the research team so they could come to the place to take samples. With each consignment five environmental swabs were first taken from the pen in which the poultry would be put. This was done by putting a plastic bag over the boots, spraying distilled water on it, then walking around the pen and after that it was possible to take swabs from the plastic bag underside the foot. The swabs were put in medium transport and kept cool in a cool box while the team was still at the sample site. 
In the mean time one of the Indonesian research members could fill in the questionnaire with the owner or another respondent because native language was used for it.
After the consignment was unloaded five environmental swabs from the transport vehicle and also five environmental swabs from the crates in which the chickens were transported were taken. 
The newly arrived chickens were observed closely, because it was preferred to take samples from the sick or moribund ones.
The number of trachea samples depended on the flock size. If the flock size was 50 chickens or more an amount of 15 trachea swabs was taken. The exact prevalence of avian influenza in Indonesia is unknown, but when looked at other studies with unvaccinated chicken you can estimate a prevalence of 25%. If you take fifteen samples out of a population of 50 animals and the estimated prevalence is 25% then the probability of diagnosing at least one animal as (truly) positive is 99%. But if the prevalence is lower, like 15%, you still have a level of confidence of 95% with taking 15 trachea samples. This was calculated using Win Episcope 2.0.


Figure 3. Level of confidence with prevalence of 25%

If the flock size was smaller than 50 only ten trachea swabs were taken instead of the normal amount of 15. If the flock size was less than 30 it was considered taking samples or not by looking at the general health of the poultry. If for example the flock only consisted of nine healthy looking chickens samples wouldn’t be taken, but it would be done if the same flock consisted of nine dying chickens.
After the farm visits, precautions to avoid further spread of (possible) infection were taken as much as possible. This was done by cleaning and disinfecting the boots and disposal of the waste.

Testing the field samples in the lab
After collecting the samples in the field, they could be kept at minus 20 degrees Celsius for a maximum of 24 hours. That’s why they were taken to the laboratory in Cikole, Lembang as soon as possible. In the lab the samples could be stored at minus 70 degrees Celsius for a longer period. Before the samples were tested for the presence of Influenza A they were first pooled into groups of five. The samples with a positive outcome were then tested for the specific H5 haemagglutinin of Influenza A.
In this laboratory, real-time PCR was used to test the field samples. The PCR provided an extremely sensitive mean of amplifying a specific sequence of DNA or cDNA (because Influenza viral genome is negative single-stranded RNA).1
The RNA was extracted using commercially available kits. RNA is an unstable molecule and RNase (enzyme that degrades RNA) is virtually ubiquitous. So it was important to handle RNA with disposable gloves and to use disposables such as pipette tips and reaction tubes that are certified RNase-free.1

Questionnaire analysis







General information concerning the slaughterhouses

Figure 4. Number of consignments


























































Table 1. Origin of Poultry

Most poultry, namely 27%, is bought in Bugis village. Jati village is the second most used place to buy chickens with 17%. But also a large number of 15% is unknown. There are also 5 villages where poultry was bought only once. The most used sub-district for buying chickens is Anjatan, with 28%. But also a relatively large number, 15%, is again unknown. Indramayu (47%) and Subang (28%) are the most used districts to buy poultry. And almost all the poultry is bought in West-Java (90%). Only 1 consignment (2%) was bought in East-Java. All these numbers are shown in table 1 above.

Figure 5. Transport hygiene

In the above figure is shown that 73% of the transport vehicles were not cleaned before leaving the PCF and 27% was cleaned before leaving. Disinfection of the transport did not happen in 96% of the occasions and did happen in 2%. The other 2% is unknown.












Table 2. PCF1: Flock size

We took samples from 17 consignments in this slaughterhouse in Maranggi, Kosambi, Cipunagara. The amount of samples depended on the flock size as is described in materials and methods. The average flock size was 62 chickens, with a maximum flock size of 104 chickens and a minimum of 43 chickens.

Figure 6. PCF1: Transport hygiene

In 59% of the occasions the transport was cleaned after the consignment arrived and 41% of the occasions the transport vehicle was not cleaned before leaving the slaughterhouse. Only in 6% of the occasions the transport was also disinfected, so 94% remained without disinfection.




Mixed with other poultry	71%	-	-	-

Table 3. PCF1: Separating or mixing the poultry

In 29% of the total consigments the chickens were put in a separate pen. This separate pen was cleaned in 20% of the cases, not cleaned in 60% of the occasions and for the other 20% it is unknown if this separate pen was cleaned or not.











Table 4. PCF1: Origin of the poultry

This owner always buys his chicken in the same sub-district, Anjatan.











Table 5. PCF2: Flock size

In this slaughterhouse we took samples from 7 consignments. The average flock size was 323 chickens, with a maximum flock size of 1080 chickens and a minimum of 40 chickens.

Figure 7. PCF2: Transport hygiene





Mixed with other poultry	29%	-	-	-

Table 6. PCF2: Separating or mixing the poultry












Table 7. PCF2: Origin of the poultry








Table 8. PCF3: Flock size

In this slaughterhouse we took samples from 11 consignments. The average flock size was 76 chickens, with a maximum flock size of 141 chickens and a minimum of 40 chickens.

Figure 8. PCF3: Transport hygiene





Mixed with other poultry	27%	-	-	-

Table 9. PCF3: Separating or mixing the poultry












Table 10. PCF3: Origin of the poultry











Table 11. PCF4: Flock size

In this slaughterhouse samples were taken from 19 consignments. The average flock size was 80 chickens, with a maximum flock size of 125 chickens and a minimum of 35 chickens.




Mixed with other poultry	89%	-	-	-

Table 12. PCF4: Separating or mixing the poultry























Table 13. PCF4: Origin of the poultry












Table 14. PCF6: Flock size

In this PCF 5 consignments were visited and sampled. The average flock size was 56 chickens, with a maximum flock size of 80 chickens and a minimum of 20 chickens.

Figure 9. PCF6: Transport hygiene





Mixed with other poultry	60%	-	-	-

Table 15. PCF6: Separating or mixing the poultry













Table 16. PCF6: Origin of the poultry

Most chickens (80%) were bought in Cipunagara sub-district, the other 20% was bought in Bojong sub-district. See table 16.













6	4 (7%)	3 (5 %)	0	0	0

Table 17. Positive PCR Results per PCF

The test results were compared with the answers from the questionnaires with the use of the Pearson Chi-square test. A significant relation between two variables is proofed when the P-value of the test is 0,05 or less.









Six poultry collector facilities were visited during this research project. The locations are shown on the maps in appendix II. Three of the six poultry collector facilities (PCF2, 5 and 6) were located close to each other on the same road. That is why it was expected that there would be more transmission of disease between these facilities because of human involvement in secondary spread.1,5,6,8-16 When we take a closer look to the poultry collector facilities which had a positive Influenza A test outcome it is seen that 9% of the positive test cases belong to PCF5 and 6 (table 17) which are located at close distance from each other. But PCF2 had no positive tests for Influenza A and the other positive cases (PCF1 and 3) are all in very different locations. No explanation can be given.

Origin of Poultry
With every consignment that was sampled questions were asked about the origin of the poultry. This was to see if there is a connection between infected flocks and the place they come from. Although there is no significant relationship between being tested positive for Influenza A and the place of origin, we see there is a lot of indirect contact possible between the collector facilities. PCF2, 4, 5 and 6 all buy chickens from Jati, Cipunagara. Both PCF2 and 4 also buy their chickens in Kertasari village. But from PCF4 a lot of information about the origin of the poultry is missing because some of these questions were not answered in the questionnaires. But also with the questionnaires of the other poultry collector facilities the village origin often proofed to be difficult to trace. So maybe there is even a higher chance of indirect contact between facilities than we know of.
Especially PCF2 and 4 have their poultry from a lot of different origins and even from far away (PCF2 from East-Java). According to a study of  identifying risk factors of HPAI movement of poultry is a significant risk factor for the spread of HPAI.16 So a higher risk possibility can be expected for these slaughterhouses. And because some slaughterhouses buy their poultry from PCF2, it is expected that these slaughterhouses have a higher risk factor too. Note, it was not asked in the questionnaire if the slaughterhouses buy their poultry from another PCF and it was not recorded so no numbers are available, but it was told by the respondents from the collector facilities that this happens sometimes.

Destination of sold live poultry
One of the questions in the questionnaire was about the selling of live birds because one of the goals of this research project was to look at the risk factors in spreading Avian Influenza and the contribution of the poultry collector facilities in this. But nothing can be said about this possible spread for no samples were taken from the destinations of the sold live birds so no laboratory test results are available.

Transport vehicles
The transport vehicles were sampled right after the consignment had been unloaded. In this way it was possible to take swabs from right under the place where the poultry was placed upon the vehicle. The thought behind this was that these were the places with most faeces pollution in which the virus could be contained. Also, it was tried to take samples from the wheels and from both sides of the vehicle. For every transport type it was tried to do it as much the same as possible. But with more than one sample-taking team it is hard to say if it worked in the field, because sometimes new people were helping. Questions about cleaning and disinfecting the transport vehicles were asked and the responses showed that in most cases there was no cleaning and disinfection at all. But not a single pool of swabs from the transport vehicles was tested positive for Influenza A. This is not in line with the expectations of this research project for it was thought that these kind of environmental factors would play an important role in the spread of HPAI. As is said before, secondary spread of disease is possible and especially mechanically after contact with contaminated faeces. Also, five consignments had a positive test for the trachea samples and the transport vehicles of these consignments were cleaned (but not disinfected) in only one occasion and the other four remained uncleaned and not disinfected, so there were at least some expectations about these specific transport vehicles being tested positive. No explanation can be given for these opposite results.

Transport crates
The same can be said about the transport crates. In only one occasion had the crate been cleaned and disinfected and the crates of the remaining four consignments were not. But still, no crate was tested positive for the presence of Influenza A.

Pens
A total of 9% of all the pens have been found positive for Influenza A. When we take a closer look at these positive cases it is interesting to see that PCF3 and PCF5 both had a positive test from samples that were taken on the same day with the same enumerator and that the consignment had been put in a separate and cleaned pen (table 9 and results PCF5) which is remarkable (although cleaning is not the same as disinfection). And that the day before this the same enumerator had visited PCF6 which had a positive test for the trachea swabs and the pens that day. And two days before that this PCF6 had positive trachea tests (but not the pens then). This of course can be coincidence and it is not possible to proof it (and no significant relation was found), but it has to be kept in mind that transmission because of human involvement is one of the possibilities.
The pens were sampled before the consignment was unloaded, but maybe it would have been interesting to take samples 24 hours later too. Also, some poultry collector facilities had more than one pen, for example PCF6 had two pens, but it was not marked on the questionnaire in which of the pens the poultry was put. So that may be another explanation for the test results being positive one time and negative the other time.

Problems in the field
It was a quiet period for the slaughterhouses and as can be seen in figure 4 it differs even among the slaughterhouses. But some slaughterhouses received more consignments than were actually tested because these consignments were not unloaded in the pens but were sold again immediately. Therefore it is possible it looked quieter than what is was in reality.
Also the data from the slaughterhouse PCF4 which received the most consignments (19) is probably more reliable than the data from PCF5 which only had one consignment. In this way it is difficult to compare slaughterhouses with each other. 
There were problems with filling in the questionnaires so a lot of data is missing and unknown. For example, one of the questions was about how many consignments a PCF received between our visits but this question has not been answered or wrongly answered (how many chickens instead of consignments) in 95% of the occasions. Two of sixty questionnaires were filled in a couple of weeks afterwards so the level of confidence can be regarded as unreliable.
Even the sample gathering was not done consistently. Before starting the fieldwork it had been decided that only one consignment per PCF per day would be sampled but at PCF2 three consignments were sampled on the same day.
It proofed to be difficult to clean and disinfect boots and protective clothing when leaving a slaughterhouse before proceeding to the next slaughterhouse. When visiting a PCF our transport was parked on the terrain of the PCF, often right next to the pen in which the poultry had been put. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE – PCF/ PSH	Identification no PCF/PSH:
SURVEILLANCE OF PCF and PSH	Date :
	Enumerator :
	
















QUESTIONNAIRE – PCF/ PSH	PCF/PSH ID no.:Consignment ID no.: 
Questions for each individual consignment	Date :
	Enumerator :
	
Type of poultry:       □ Broiler                     □ Ayam kampung                □ Spent layers                    □ Spent parent stock   □ Male layers                       □ Other ……………………. ......
Number of birds:……………………………………………………………………........
Origin of poultry (Village / sub-district / district / province):Village……………………………………………………………………………………Sub-district………………………………………………………………………………District…………………………………………………………………………………… Province…………………………………………………………………………………
Was the consignment put into a separate pen or mixed with other poultry?        □ Separate pen*                       □ Mixed                       □ Don’t know                  *If put in a separate pen, was the pen clean?       □ Yes                □ No              □ Don’t know                             
Method of transportation:       □ Truck             □ Car             □ Motorcycle           □ Other ……………………. .....                         
Was the transport cleaned before leaving the PCF/PSH?       □ Yes                □ No              □ Don’t know                  
Was the transport disinfected before leaving the PCF/PSH?       □ Yes                □ No              □ Don’t know                  
Were the crates that the birds were transported in cleaned before leaving the PCF/PSH?            □ Yes                □ No              □ Don’t know                  
Were the crates that the birds were transported in disinfected before leaving the PCF/PSH?            □ Yes                □ No              □ Don’t know                  
What was the destination of any sold live birds:                     □ No live birds sold                  Village……………………………………………………………………………………Sub-district………………………………………………………………………………District…………………………………………………………………………………… Province…………………………………………………………………………………
How many consignments has the PCF/PSH received since our previous visit?..………………………………………………………………………………………….

To be completed by the enumerator:

Estimated number of dead birds in this consignment:...............………………………………………………………………………………….








Research area; Cipunagara sub-district, Subang, West Java


Closer view from the image above

Figure 1. Showing severe congestion and edema of comb and wattles 1

Figure 2. Taking a trachea sample 1
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